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This paper traces interpersonal utility comparisons and bargaining in the work of John Harsanyi from the 1950s to the mid-1960s. As his preoccupation with how theorists can obtain information about agents moved from an approach centered on empathetic understanding to the more distanced perspective associated with game theory, Harsanyi shifted emphasis from the social scientist's lack of information vis-à-vis agents to agents' lack of information about each other. In the process, he provided economists with an analytical framework they could use to study problems related to the distribution of information among agents while consolidating the perspective of a distant observer whose knowledge can replace that of real people.

This book is a collection of essays in honor of John C. Harsanyi. Originally, we hoped that it would be ready in the year of his 70th birthday, but we did not quite succeed. It sometimes takes longer than anticipated to do things as well as one wants. I think that John Harsanyi will understand this. It is my desire to express our thanks to all those who helped to make the book possible, especially to the publishing house, the Springer Verlag. I am grateful to Hildegard Grober who assisted us in the organizational tasks connected to our editorial effort. I am deeply indebted to Horace W. Brock. His active support was extremely valuable. The results of my editorial efforts should partly be attributed to him. Reinhard Selten Table of Contents Introduction 1 I. Coopera. tive Game Theory The Consistent Shapley Value for Games without Side Payments by Michael Maschler and Guillermo Owen 5 Fictitious-Transfer Solutions in Cooperative Game Theory by Roger B. Myerson 13 The Finagle Point for Characteristic Function Games by Guillermo Owen 35 Voting by Count and Account by Bezalel Peleg 45 Fee Games: (N)TU-Games with Incomplete Information by Joachim Rosenmftller 53 A Non-Cooperative Interpretation of Value and Potential 83 by Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell II

Durant la crise sanitaire, le personnel de santé a été confronté au tri des patients. Ce texte vise à comprendre en fonction de quoi se font les choix de priorisation en situation de pandémie où les dilemmes éthiques sont accentués. Pour ce faire, il fait référence à l'histoire des idées, en particulier au dialogue entre deux penseurs et deux champs disciplinaires : John Rawls, philosophe, et John Harsanyi, économiste. Le dialogue devient imaginaire dès lors que l'on aborde la Covid-19, néanmoins toujours instructif quant aux critères de priorisation, mais aussi aux limites d'un système qui oblige à ce genre de décision et aggrave les inégalités déjà existantes.

This paper analyzes the early contributions of John Harsanyi and Thomas C. Schelling to bargaining theory. In the 1950s, Harsanyi draws Nash's solution to two-person cooperative games from the bargaining model proposed by Zeuthen (1930), and Schelling proposes a multifaceted theory of conflict that, without dismissing the assumption of rational behavior, points out some of its paradoxical consequences. Harsanyi's and Schelling's contrasting views on the axiom of symmetry, as postulated by Nash (1950), are then presented. This debate explains why, although in the early 1960s two different approaches to link strategic interaction and bargaining theory were proposed, only Harsanyi's insights were fully developed later.

This groundbreaking series brings together a critical selection of key papers by the Nobel Memorial Laureates in Economics that have helped shape the development and present state of economics. The editors have organised this comprehensive series by theme and each volume focuses on those Laureates working in the same broad area of study. The careful selection of papers within each volume is set in context by an insightful introduction to the Laureates' careers and main published works. This landmark series will be an essential reference for scholars throughout the world

Pour rendre compte du comportement rationnel d'ordre éthique, Harsanyi reprend la figure du spectateur impartial de Smith. Or, des différences significatives apparaissent, entre les deux auteurs, concernant le traitement du jugement moral. Chez Harsanyi, il s'agit d'un jugement déterminant qui part d'une connaissance mathématique des préférences morales et évalue quantitativement les conséquences des actions. Chez Smith, le jugement réfléchissant du spectateur impartial opère de manière approximative, par analogie et induction. Derrière les deux formes de jugement, se confrontent deux modèles d'action et deux conceptions différentes des rapports entre les actes économiques et la morale.